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Abstract
Information history is moving beyond listing the “what” and to an-
swering how-and-why systems emerged, prospered, or died. This 
paper explores the nature of (and debates over) explanation in 
historical studies. The conclusion is that the history of information 
has to rely upon complex explanations that are a mixture of social 
science and humanities approaches. There are no formulas for such 
historical work, as shown by Boyd Rayward’s sensitive efforts on the 
history of Paul Otlet’s career and personal life.
Boyd Rayward’s work has inspired many of us who explore the history of 
information to go beyond listing the “what happened” and attempt to 
explain—to identify the “how and why” of a system’s or institution’s emer-
gence, successes and failures, impact, and, perhaps, lingering decline.1 
However, explaining is a difficult and complex challenge. It is more de-
manding of logic and evidence than listing the “what” in history; evaluat-
ing the internal merits of a technical contribution; or, pejoratively declar-
ing the influence of such things as chauvinism or sexism.2 Explaining also 
depends on more rigorous research than does, for example, categorizing 
an individual or enterprise as being covered by a historical construct such 
as The Age of Information (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998) or The Control 
Era (Beniger, 1986). 
Explaining in historical work is more challenging than in the physical 
or biological sciences (or clinical/experimental social sciences) because 
history was never a closed system in which a few “controlled” variables 
could determine an outcome. Causation in institutional and human lives 
is rarely simple or tidy, and causal factors may interact in unexpected and 
complicated ways. 
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Identifying “causes” in history is demanding. Even statistical tech-
niques used to establish post facto controls have their limits in historical 
research. A historian might use sophisticated statistical tests to estimate, 
for example, the relationship between the distribution of the number of 
Catholic churches across geographic units and Democratic voting in the 
United States since the 1920s. Such studies are vital preludes to explana-
tion. However, the resulting estimates will not usually be a full explanation 
of any individual’s political choice—although they might add the weight 
of probability to a specification of the reasons for a voter’s decision.3
In addition, explanation requires much more than giving recognition 
to broad historical economic contexts. General social/demographic or 
economic trends may contribute to historical outcomes, but they are un-
likely to be sufficient, anywhere near complete, explanations. Sufficient 
explaining, furthermore, cannot rely only on social or psychological theo-
ries. Existing theories are too limited in their reach, and lawlike social and 
historical theories may well restrict an investigator’s research to only the 
factors they emphasize.4 
Inescapably, historians have had to call upon humanities-based con-
cepts, such as motives and choices, to explain outcomes. As well as requir-
ing sensitive weighing of the role of sociological, economic, and market 
factors, explaining usually requires evidence-based exploration of the de-
tails of the lives and decisions of those who built and managed technolo-
gies and systems. 
There are other complications in explaining. Causation in history is 
rarely instantaneous. A significant outcome may be the result of a choice 
or action decades before. For example, a financially well-situated com-
puter company might decide to reduce its investment in long-term re-
search and then find years later that it missed a critical shift in technol-
ogy.5 Or, an aspiring young mathematician may have been attracted to a 
college’s small computer-based program to find that he was in an advanta-
geous position when his instructor’s professional and personal connec-
tions linked him to a rise in funding for a new field such as automatic 
information retrieval.6 
Because of all this, a valid historical explanation may appear disor-
derly and “chatty,” seemingly unscientific. But such complexity does not 
indicate poor methodology. In fact, the acceptance of any attractive and 
sweeping historical generalizations that posit causation has to be based on 
the accumulation and analysis of well-grounded yet “messy” historical ex-
planations of particular happenings. Any post facto “controls” needed to 
estimate the role of grand general causes are achieved through structured 
comparisons of findings based on research that has been open to identify-
ing all possible influences.
There has been a reawakening of the need for “cluttered” explanatory 
history and for focusing on the particular before generalizing. For exam-
 thanks, prof. rayward/burke 295
ple, the failure of all-encompassing deterministic historical explanations, 
such as Marxism, and new explorations of the history of technology by 
researchers such as Thomas Parke Hughes, have demonstrated that de-
tailed and localized historical research is a necessity and that the technical 
merits of systems have rarely been sufficient to account for their careers.7 
Leaders in 1950–60s social science and demographic analytic history, 
such as Lawrence Stone of Princeton University, also found that particular-
istic and proximate, even biographical, narrative history was irreplaceable 
(Stone, 1979; Haskell [1998] also discusses this issue). The narrative form 
is like a story. It has a beginning and ending, a thematic integration, and 
its biographical structure includes an interwoven mix of causal types rang-
ing from truisms to social or economic laws. 
Using the narrative form does indicate a belief in subjectivity or histori-
cal simplicity. Even Relativists and Postmodernist historical philosophers, 
from the 1930s to the 1990s, who proclaimed there was “no truth” in his-
torical research, frequently rejected their own precepts. They turned to 
a belief in “facts” and detailed (with epistemic confidence) the history of 
such things as the Enlightenment, scientific research, women’s history, and 
European prison systems.8 Scholars of the 1980s and 1990s who favored 
the relativistic “linguistic” approach in anthropology also became aware of 
the complexity of cultures and personalities. They became sensitive to the 
incompleteness of theory-dictated (and thus restricted) descriptions and 
explanations while they accepted the possibility of “true” history.9 
Information history should be informed by the return to complex, 
time-sequence, and causally interactive explanations. It has already been 
shown that in some critical instances, information work has been a deeply 
human activity that was shaped by unpredictable combinations of disor-
derly influences including reasons, values, health, family obligations, and 
ambitions. Of course, multiple contextual factors, ranging from law and 
politics to transportation costs, also played significant roles. 
Furthermore, it appears that such complex histories were best orga-
nized through a personalized (biographical) narrative, not analytic, ap-
proach. Wayne A. Wiegand’s book (1996) on Melvil Dewey, Stephen J. 
Bensman’s work (2007) on Eugene Garfield, and Michael Buckland’s 
volume (2006) on Emanuel Goldberg stand as examples of the need for 
rather personalized “information” histories. Historians of information 
technology companies, ranging from IBM, CDC, and Xerox, to Microsoft 
and Apple, have also had to call on the “fickle,” personal, and nonre-
ducible in history to complete their stories. Good examples are Carrol 
(1993); Ellis (2006); Isaacson (2011); Manes & Andrews (1993); Malone 
(1999); and Worthy (1987).
Boyd Rayward has made information historians aware of those and 
other trends in historiography. He linked information history to broader 
historical work, such as that of France’s famed Annales school of social 
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history, and to the newest historical sociology represented by Anthony 
Giddens (1987). But it is his efforts on a particular segment of informa-
tion history that is, so far, his greatest contribution.10
Especially important guides for future explaining, and for managing 
the details of information history, are Rayward’s efforts on the birth, life, 
and erratic career of Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine’s grand inter-
national “House of Documentation.” This seemingly inexplicable 1895 
attempt to build a central repository for all the world’s knowledge, and to 
do so in the tiny country of Belgium while the powerful British Empire 
was planning its own great information venture, has been the target of 
Rayward’s untiring efforts for decades.11
Rayward has done much more than detail the technical “what” of the 
gigantic file-card repository in Brussels and of the Universal Decimal Clas-
sification system devised for retrieving information from it and, hopefully, 
the entire world’s publications. His tireless archival labors have helped us 
understand that personal characteristics, family connections and finances, 
social and national goals, nationalistic conflicts, ideology, and politics 
(not just technological–financial–market opportunities and limitations) 
led to the triumphs and tragedies of the Repertoire Bibliographique Uni-
versel, the Universal Decimal Classification, and Otlet and La Fontaine’s 
many ambitious world peace initiatives. 
 The search for answers to another set of information history’s “how 
and why” challenges has, like Rayward’s explorations, revealed an indis-
putable need for evidence-based, “chatty” explanations. The mysteries are 
the origins and fate of the ambitions of one of Otlet and Fontaine’s al-
lies, the American Herbert Haviland Field. His broad science-information 
goals centered on his 1890’s Concilium Bibliographicum of Zurich, 
Switzerland. It was soon providing a biweekly card-based and sophisti-
catedly classified bibliography of all the world’s zoological publications. 
He hoped his service would eventually cover a wide range of science and 
technology topics. At the high points of its tumultuous near fifty-year his-
tory, the Concilium was sending millions of cards a year to its subscribers 
in Europe, America, and even the Pacific region—and it was fulfilling its 
pledge to survey all the publications in its fields of interest. (See Burke, 
in press.) 
 The histories of the Concilium and, necessarily, Herbert Field and his 
family, are complex. The Concilium’s emergence and its fate are not suf-
ficiently explained by general influences such as the rise of professional-
ized science, the new technology of index cards, or the rising need for 
summaries of the burgeoning science literature.12 The lives of Herbert, 
the Concilium, and his family also do not yield to a narrow definition of 
the subjects of study, or to monocausal explanations. 
Answering the many intertwined “how and why” questions in the Con-
cilium’s past demanded an examination of more than the technical/ 
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economic aspects of Concilium’s products. The Field family’s interna-
tional connections, Herbert’s religion, his multilingual abilities, his con-
tacts with the most powerful men and institutions in America’s Eastern 
liberal intellectual and political elites, his ties to Europe’s intellectual set, 
and his family’s and his own financial highs and lows played important 
roles in the Concilium’s story. 
Anything approaching an explanation of Herbert’s information proj-
ect’s life also has to include national competitions over the control of 
bibliographic services, the impact of World War I and the Russian Revolu-
tion, Herbert’s role as an intelligence agent, and the emergence of new 
types of science practice—ones that saw little need for the Concilium’s in-
tellectually elegant classification scheme based on the Universal Decimal 
Classification. Even the health of the Fields and Herbert’s speech prob-
lems played significant parts. The histories of other related science in-
formation systems, ranging from professional journals to the abstracting 
services of the first half of the twentieth century, and the rather mystifying 
history of Herbert’s family after his untimely death just after World War I, 
also called for deep explorations and complex explanations that included 
influences such as the weakness of the League of Nations, the rise of inter-
national Communism, and the impact of Progressive education and new 
philanthropies. 
There are uncounted numbers of other information adventures and 
systems that need deep explanations. Among the many, many tantalizing 
puzzles that should tweak the interest of historians are the attempt by two 
ex-chemists at America’s small nonprofit Western Reserve University in 
the 1950s to create a huge profit-making sci-tech information center;13 
the conflict-torn crusade by the United States’ ex–Vice-President Henry 
Wallace, and his left-leaning political allies, to establish a vast government-
run information system for small businessmen;14 the important role of a 
once rather placid college, Stanford University, in automated informa-
tion retrieval;15 the travails of the League Nations and the United Nations’ 
(UNISIT) information efforts;16 the wanderings of the Council on Library 
Resources on its quest for consistent policy;17 and, the prestigious University 
of Chicago library school’s loss of a position of leadership in the process-
ing of “information” by the 1950s.18 From the work that has already been 
done on these puzzles, it seems they will deserve complex, perhaps “chatty” 
narratives.
Notes
  1.  On trends in the work on information history, see Burke (2007).
  2.  An irreplaceable discussion of types of valid explanation in the various “hard” sciences, and 
in the social sciences and history, is Nagel (1979). He makes it clear that hard science’s 
most revered causal explanation patterns, such as those based on necessary or sufficient 
conditions, are admirable but difficult to fulfill in historical studies because of the lack 
of experimental control. However, Nagel believes in the possibility of valid evidentially 
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based explanations in historical work—although they may not fit the experimentally 
based determinate law models. The debates over explanation in general, and in history, 
continue. On explanation in general, works that contain up-to-date arguments and bib-
liographies are Cornwell (2004) and Strevens (2008). A useful new work for explanation 
in history is Gaddis (2002).
  3.  The study of voting was one of the first targets of the new post-WWII quantitative social 
science research in the United States. Advanced statistical methods allowed the produc-
tion of many sophisticated studies of contemporary and historical voting patterns. Those 
studies served as evidential foundations for explanations and were used to test standing 
explanatory hypotheses. However, satisfactory explanation demanded more than statistics. 
Take, for example, the concluding chapters in the classic work by Benson (1970). 
  4.  On the great hopes for all-encompassing mid-level, not grand, law-based social science and 
historical theories, such as role theory or reference-group theory, see Berelson (1963); 
Campbell (1960); Benson (1972); and Kammen (1980). Some of that faith in using 
“scientific” methodology in history “trickled-down” to a more practical level, as shown in 
Fischer (1970). In the years after World War II, there also was a faith that “information” 
would soon have its own mathematical and perhaps axiomatic theories based on a few 
powerful “laws.” The most famous example of that is Shannon and Weaver (1949).
  5.  One of the more recent examples is the case of the Hewlett-Packard Corporation: Neate 
(2012).
  6.  See Akera (2006) and Cohen (1999) for insights into the influence of personalities and 
connections to important figures, such as Warren Weaver, on the careers of two informa-
tion science pioneers, Anthony Qettinger and Gerard Salton.
  7.  A readable source that provides an introduction to the rejection of the deterministic 
grand historical explanations, and the tangled history of responses, is Novick (1988). 
An insight into the relatively early turn away from grand theory in sociology is Merton, 
R. K. (1968). The rejoinders to claims that historical work cannot be objective and that 
there is no “nature,” just socially constructed views, is discussed below. Examples of the 
acceptable restrained version of “social construction” of technological systems are found 
in Bijker (1987) and Bowker & Starr (1999). 
  8.  See the work of some famous relativists: Becker (1931); Foucault (1995); and Latour 
(1986) and (1999). Kuhn (1996) and Conant & Haugeland (2000) also show that one 
of the most famous supposed “relativists,” Thomas S. Kuhn, did not abandon a belief in 
the possibility of truth in historical work.
   There are now many telling criticisms of the subjectivity theses as found in the more 
extreme versions of Postmodernism. For example: Gross & Levitt (1994); Gross, Levitt, 
& Lewis (1994); Kortege (1998); and Martin (2009).
  9.  Helpful on anthropology and cultural studies is Erickson & Murphy (2003). Iggers (1997) 
and Wilder (2012) discuss recent trends in historical research methods and premises.
10.  Some of his more recent social-science related works are Rayward (1996); Rayward (2008).
11.  Prof. Rayward has written many articles on Otlet and plans a full biography, but his epic 
remains: Rayward (1975).
12.  Interesting work on the increase in the amount of scientific literature and accompanying 
problems is found in Csiszar (2010).
13.  Introductions to the question are Bowles (1998) and Cramer (1976). 
14.  First steps toward answers are in Culver and Hyde (2000) and Stewart (1993). 
15.  Lowen (1997) and Bourne & Hahn (2003) provide starting points.
16.  Useful entries into the complex histories are Bennett (1950); Nordstrom (1986); Pycior 
(1978); Williams (1988); and International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (1933). 
17.  Marcum (2002) provides many insights and a valuable bibliography.
18.  Paths toward answers are in Richardson (1982) and Vann (1971).
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